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bstract
Research on economic complexity has shown that a country’s type of exports conditions its future path of economic diversification
nd economic growth. Yet little emphasis has been put on the inequality associated with the types of products traded between countries
nd different regions of the world. Here we analyze the income inequality associated with the imports and exports of 116 countries
n the period from 1970 to 2010. Our analysis shows that methods from network science and visual complexity research can help
o reevaluate old theories in economics, such as core-periphery structures in international trade or structural development traps.
ur results illustrate that the core-periphery structure of global trade affects not only the income inequality between countries,
ut also the income inequality within countries. Moreover, they reveal the structural constraints that developing and emerging
conomies face in promoting inclusive growth and benchmark their productive transformations with cases of successful catching
p and developed economies. The results show that countries, such as South Korea or Germany, have benefited from outsourcing
igh inequality products. In contrast, some middle-income countries, such as Brazil or South Africa, face structural development
onstraints consisting of a large average distance of their export products to low inequality products and a “gravitational force”
owards high inequality products. Finally, developing economies, such as Nicaragua or Sri Lanka face a double development trap
or inclusive growth, as their economies depend on both a large share of high inequality exports and imports.
eywords: Trade; Inequality; Economic complexity; Development trap
2019 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of National Association of Postgraduate Cen-
ers in Economics, ANPEC. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
. Introduction
The positive and negative effects of globalization and international trade are at the center of heated debates in
conomics. While one side points to the positive effects of international trade on knowledge diffusion, productive
fficiency, economic growth and global welfare, the other side highlights the negative effects of international tradePlease cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
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on income inequality between and within countries (Singer, 1950; Prebisch, 1962; Krueger, 1985; Proudman and
Redding, 2000; Srinivasan and Bhagwati, 2001; Stiglitz, 2002; Cimoli et al., 2015). It is no secret that during the process
of economic development, developed economies, such as Germany or South Korea, have outsourced less desirable
productive activities, such as simple textile products, and focused instead on more value-added and sophisticated
product, such as cars or computer parts. In contrast, many developing and emerging economies have tended to focus
on the export of simple products, such as fruits, textiles, or mining products, that are often associated with low labor
costs, exploitation of natural resources and high levels of inequality (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Hartmann et al.,
2017).
Both companies and consumers in developed economies benefit from the lower prices of the inputs produced
in countries with lower labor costs and weaker labor laws (Frobel et al., 1976; Baldwin, 2008). Not surprisingly the
exploitation of workers in developing countries in supplying inputs for richer industrialized economies has been sharply
criticized (Charnovitz, 1987; Martin and Maskus, 2001). But developing economies may also gain from making the
first steps towards industrialization steps by simple manufactures, such as textiles. Moreover, it must also be mentioned
that a large share of the imports of developed economies are not exploitative products from developing countries, but
rather complex products, such as cars, specialized machine tools, and medical equipment, that are associated with lower
levels of inequality in the countries producing them. Thus, an evaluation that developed economies are prosperous
because they exploit poor economies does not seem to be the full story.
What is clear is that trade seems to have a significant effect on income inequality. Most studies in trade and
development economics, though, have focused more on the effects of international trade pattern on economic growth
and the income differences between countries than on the effects on international trade on income differences within
countries. Recent research has shown that the economic catch-up and leapfrogging ahead processes in several Asian
economies had a significant effect on job losses of the middle class in developed economies (Milanovic, 2011; Autor
et al., 2013). Yet, a more comprehensive picture of the effects of global trade on the income inequality in developing,
emerging and developed economies is missing. Arguably, new methods from complexity research (Hidalgo et al.,
2007; Hausmann et al., 2014; Hartmann et al., 2017) can contribute to the challenge of disentangling the complex
relationships between global trade networks and income inequality.
Here, we use methods from economic complexity research to analyze the income inequality associated with the
export and import portfolio of 116 countries and their bilateral trade between 1970 and 2010. The application of
methods from network science and complexity research helps us reevaluate ideas on core-periphery structures of trade
(Prebisch, 1962; Wallerstein, 2004) and to illustrate the income inequality associated with countries’ trade specialization
and partners. Moreover, these methods help to reveal how successful catching-up economies have changed their trade
portfolio to promote inclusive growth and quantify the structural development traps faced by developing and middle-
income countries (Felipe et al., 2012a,b; Jankowska et al., 2012; Lee, 2013). The remainder of this paper is structured
as follows. Section 2 provides a literature brief on core-periphery structures of trade, economic complexity and income
inequality. Section 3 introduces the data and methods. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 provides concluding
remarks.
2. Literature review
The need of developing countries to diversify and sophisticate their productive structures, and the role of the embed-
dedness of international trade networks for their economic diversification processes, has been extensively discussed
in development economics and politics (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Furtado, 1959; Fajnzylber, 1990; Hausmann et al.,
2014; Cimoli et al., 2009, 2015).
Several researchers have argued that developing economies are poor due to their trade specialization and embed-
dedness in the global trade system, in which rich countries from the center of the world economy focus on a varied
set of knowledge-intensive and value-added products, whereas developing economies from the periphery of the world
economy specialize in simple, resource and labor exploiting products (Prebisch, 1962; Wallerstein, 2004; Cimoli and
Katz, 2003; Cimoli et al., 2015; Gala et al., 2017). Of particular interest for theories on global center-periphery structurePlease cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
has been the Prebisch–Singer hypothesis, arguing that the price of primary products decreases relative to the price of
manufactured products in the long run because those manufactured goods have a higher income elasticity of demand
than primary products (Singer, 1950; Prebisch, 1962). Thus with increasing income, the demand for manufactured
goods rises more sharply than the demand for primary commodities. This mechanism undermines economic growth in
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he periphery of the world economy and results in the persistence and increase of income inequality across countries
rom the center and the periphery of the world economy. In a similar vein, Wallerstein (2004) also argued that the
tructures of the global market are accountable for global inequality. The world system redistributes surplus value
rom the periphery (i.e., poor primary goods-based countries) to the core (rich industrialized economies), allowing the
erpetration of the exploitation of the former by the latter. To overcome this underdevelopment mechanism and reduce
heir foreign dependency on industrialized imports, several Latin American and African economies introduced highly
rotectionist trade policies in the 1960s to 1970s. The inward oriented model of import substitution industrialization
avored state-driven economic diversification through high taxes on imports, nationalization, and subsidization of key
ndustries. This model had some (initial) success in economies with a relatively large internal market, such as Brazil
r Argentina, yet most economies ended up with severe inefficiencies and a profound economic crises in the 1980s
Krueger, 1985).
It must be noted that when engaging in the international trade of more complex products, countries have the
pportunity to enhance their pool of collective knowledge and efficiency by being part of a bigger knowledge society
Stiglitz et al., 2014) which can have a positive impact on the quality of a country’s exports and economic development
n the long run (Gereffi, 1999; Bathelt et al., 2004; Macgarvie, 2006). Most developed economies not only import
ow value-added products from developing economies, but also import and learn from a large share of sophisticated
roducts. Modern global value chains can greatly increase the knowledge, efficiency, and quality of sophisticated
roducts, such as cars, smartphones or airplanes. Inwards-looking, protectionist international trade policies were for
any years harmful to the development process of several developing economies and disconnected them from global
nowledge flows. While the emergence of industrial parks has been observed all across the world, many developing
conomies, e.g. in Latin America, Africa, and Asia are still mainly exporting simple products associated with cheap
abor and resource richness, and import complex manufacturing and chemical products without engaging in learning
y interacting (Hartmann et al., 2016). Many of these countries find themselves in a development trap because they are
ot able to enhance their pool of collective knowledge due to the lack of appropriate institutions and industrial policies
romoting both internal and external learning (Stiglitz et al., 2014).
In contrast to the inwards-looking and mainly state-driven “import substitution industrialization” strategy of several
atin American economies, several East Asian economies have chosen an export-led strategy, in which they com-
ined both state and market forces to promote local and international learning, resulting in the diversification of their
conomies into more value-added and complex products (Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1992; Stiglitz, 1996). Several countries,
uch as South Korea or Singapore, have not only caught up, but also leapfrogged ahead into more complex products
ssociated with higher wages and lower levels of inequality (Hartmann et al., 2016). These countries have also been
ore successful in overcoming the middle-income trap, than for instance Brazil, South Africa, or Indonesia (Amsden,
992; Jankowska et al., 2012; Felipe et al., 2012a; Lee, 2013). These East Asian economies quickly upgraded their
nfrastructure, established high-quality education system, and diversified into complex industries. In contrast, Brazil
nd South Africa, which have exploited their natural advantages, suffer from low investment, limited economic diver-
ification, and poor labor market conditions. They have not yet been able to move their resource-driven economies
riven by cheap labor and natural abundance, towards a more knowledge-driven and inclusive economies, based on
nteractive learning and prolific policy co-ordination in the areas of education, infrastructure, innovation and financing
Rhee, 2012; Jankowska et al., 2012; Lee, 2013).
Recently, a consensus has emerged in development economics, that in order to catch-up and leapfrog ahead, devel-
ping countries may need to (1) overcome both market and government failures, (2) establish learning institutions by
inking industry, state, science and the civil society and facilitating both endogenous innovation and external learning,
nd (3) promote smart diversification strategies (Freeman, 1987; Rodrik, 2004; Hartmann, 2014; Hartmann et al.,
018).
.1. Smart diversification policies, economic complexity, and inclusive growth
Smart economic diversification strategies consider the feasibility and desirability of different products or technolo-Please cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
ies for each country and/or region (Hartmann et al., 2018; Balland et al., 2018). Moreover, successful diversification
trategies require countries to jump towards products at the right stage in their development (Alshamsi et al., 2018).
iversification strategies are very likely to fail when a country aims to jump too far away into completely unre-
ated activities, especially at the wrong moment. (Hidalgo et al., 2007; Pinheiro et al., 2018; Alshamsi et al.,
+Model ARTICLE IN PRESSECON-161; No. of Pages 24
4 D. Hartmann et al. / EconomiA xxx (2019) xxx–xxx
2018). Jumping too close or into the wrong products can hamper the long-run economic development prospects.
For instance, mere emphasis on natural resources, such as crude petroleum, may generate income, but can under-
mine long-run economic development and lead to high levels of income inequality in a country (Hartmann et al.,
2017). New methods of economic complexity research help to both identify the feasibility and desirability of
different product options, by taking a country’s structural constraints and opportunities into account (Hartmann
et al., 2018).
In a seminal paper, Hidalgo et al. (2007) combined methods from economics and complexity research to show
that usually countries are not able to randomly jump from one type of product to another, but their path of economic
diversification is strongly conditioned by the positioning of their exports in the product space. The product space is a
network estimating the relatedness/closeness of hundreds of different export products. It estimates the shared productive
capabilities required to produce two different trade products based on the conditional probability that two products are
co-exported (Hidalgo et al., 2007; Hausmann et al., 2014). The core-periphery structure of the product space also implies
that countries exporting only products in the periphery of the product space, such as such as cocoa beans, copper, or
crude petroleum, may find themselves in a development trap that consists of a great distance from more central areas of
the product space, in which more complex products, such as cars, medicine or robots are positioned (Hidalgo et al., 2007;
Jankowska et al., 2012). Subsequent research has also shown that only a small percentage of countries’ diversification
jumps are unrelated, i.e. into more distant parts of the product space, and these unrelated variety jumps typically occur
at intermediate levels of economic development and relatively high levels of human capital (Pinheiro et al., 2018). This
difficulty of moving into unrelated and complex products is a severe problem for countries that are dependent on primary
products, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran or South Africa. There is also strong empirical evidence that countries exporting
complex products tend to have a significantly higher level of GDP per capita and economic growth outlook than
countries that produce simple or resource-based products in the periphery of the product space (Hidalgo and Hausmann,
2009; Felipe et al., 2012a,b; Cristelli et al., 2013; Hausmann et al., 2014).
However, the type of products that countries exports not only conditions their total income, but also the distribution of
income within the countries. Recent research has shown that countries exporting complex products have a significantly
lower level of income inequality than countries exporting simple products (Hartmann et al., 2017). There are several
reasons for this. Diversified and complex productive structures require more inclusive institutions with better educated,
well paid and empowered workers (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Hartmann, 2014;
Hartmann et al., 2017). Workers in a diversified economy tend to have a wider range of job choices, tend to form
more efficient unions, and thus tend to have more bargaining power. For instance, a hypothetical coffee company
in an economy that is almost exclusively exporting coffee is probably able to pay simple workers lower salaries
than if the same coffee company would be located in an economy with multiple different industries. Moreover, it
is arguably harder to force a high-skilled employee in a pharmaceutical industry to work in exploitative conditions
and achieve a low salary, than to force a low-skilled employed in a simple agricultural activity. Finally, a complex
economy is likely to be associated with a better distribution of political and economic power (Collier, 2007; Hartmann
et al., 2017).
Moreover, recent research has estimated the level of income inequality associated with different types of goods, such
as crude petroleum, coffee beans or machines (Hartmann et al., 2017). The Product Gini Index (PGI) proxies the level
of income inequality associated with different 775 different types of export goods. Formally, the PGI is defined as the
average level of income inequality of a product’s exporters, weighted by the importance of each product in a country’s
export basket. Among the products associated with high levels of inequality are simple agricultural products, such as
cocoa beans or cotton, as well as mining products, such as copper, zinc or nickel. Among the products associated with
low inequality, feature more complex, knowledge-based activities, such as medicaments, hormones or X-Ray machines,
or specialized machinery. The PGIs have been used to compare structural constraints of income inequality in Latin
America and High Performing Asian Economies (HPAE) and design smart strategies for economic diversification
and inclusive growth (Hartmann et al., 2016, 2018). These studies showed that Latin American economies have a
significantly higher XGini index—an index measuring the average PGI values associated with a country’s export
portfolio— than HPAE (Hartmann et al., 2016). Nonetheless developing economies, such as e.g. Paraguay, do havePlease cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
opportunities to reduce their dependency on simple exports and move into related, lower PGI and higher complexity
products (Hartmann et al., 2018).
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.2. Literature gap regarding the PGIs associated with the bilateral trade between countries and geographic
egions
New approaches from economic complexity research have helped to obtain a more detailed “fingerprint” of the pro-
uctive structure of economies, and a better understanding of the effect of productive diversification and sophistication
n economic growth and income inequality. Yet little emphasis has been put on using these new methods to analyze
he inequality associated with the mutual trade between countries or different continents / economic regions. I order to
ddress this gap, here we analyze the income inequality associated with both the export and import portfolios of 116
ountries between 1970 and 2015. This helps us to reveal the core-periphery structure of income inequality associated
ith global trade. Moreover, we create a global ranking of Export Gini (XGini) and Import Gini (ImpGini) of the 116
ountries and analyze their evolution between 1970 and 2015. Finally, we measure the average distance of countries’
xport portfolio to low PGI products. This allows us to reveal the structural development trap that countries face at a
edium stage of economic development.
. Data and methods
Data on income inequality comes from the Galbraith et al., 2014 (GINI EHII dataset). Data on international trade
omes from the MIT’s Observatory of Economic Complexity (atlas.media.mit.edu). Concerning the trade data, we use
he Standard International Trade Classification SITC-4 rev 2, since it provides an extended time series from 1962 to
014. This dataset combines exports data from 1962 to 2000, compiled by Feenstra et al. (2005), and data from the
.N. Comtrade for the period between 2001 and 2010. In line with Pinheiro et al. (2018), we reduce noise coming from
nderreporting and from variations in the size of the economies of countries and products by discarding all countries
ith a population of lower than 1.2 million citizens, a total trade below USD 1 billion in 2008. Moreover, we exclude
roducts for which all yearly trade flows were valued at less than 5,000 USD and all products with exports value equal
o zero for more than 80% of the countries. Additionally, products with a global export of less than USD 10 million
nd countries whose exports equal to zero for 95% of the products are also excluded. After applying these filters, our
nal sample consists of 116 countries, representing 97.45% of global GDP and 86.67% of global trade in 2008.
Data on economic complexity comes from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (atlas.media.mit.edu). The
conomic Complexity Index measures the diversity and sophistication of the productive structure of a country, and
hus also the knowledge embedded in an economy, by considering both the diversity and the ubiquity of the products
hat a country exports (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009; Hausmann et al., 2014). The advantage is that this index not
nly considers the aggregate level of production, such as GDP per capita, or the number and balance of products, such
s variety or entropy measures, but also how many countries are able to export a particular product. For instance, while
any countries are able to export fish, only a relatively limited number of countries are able to export X-Ray machines.
We make use of the Product Space to estimate the relatedness between different types of export products (Hidalgo
t al., 2007; Hausmann et al., 2014) and the Product Gini Index (Hartmann et al., 2017) to reveal the level of inequality
ssociated with different parts of the product space.
The product space estimates the level of shared productive capabilities between two products, based on the con-
itional probability that countries export both products with a revealed comparative advantage (Hidalgo et al., 2007).
φ
pp
′ =
∑
cMcpMcp′
max
(
kp,  kp′
)
here φ
pp
′ measures the proximity between two products p and p′ in the product space the c and the matrix Mcp is 1
f a country c has a revealed comparative advantage in product p and is 0 otherwise.
The product space allows us to estimate the entry likelihood of new products, according to the density of comparative
dvantages in products that are related to this potential new product. For this purpose, we measure the density ω ofPlease cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
roducts with revealed comparative advantages around product p in the product basket of country c.
ωcp =
∑
p
′ M
cp
′ φ
pp
′
∑
p
′ φ
pp
′
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The Product Ginis (PGI) we calculate in line with Hartmann et al. (2016, 2017). The Product Gini Index (PGI) is
defined as the average level of income inequality of a product’s exporters, weighted by the importance of each product
in a country’s export basket. The PGI of product p is calculated as:
PGIp = 1
Np
∑
p
McpScpGinic
where Ginic is the Gini coefficient of country c, Mcp is 1 if country c exports product p with revealed comparative
advantage (RCA) (Balassa, 1965) and 0 otherwise, scp is the share of country c’s exports represented by product p. Np
is a normalizing factor that ensures PGIs are the weighted average of the Ginis. Np and scp are calculated as:
Scp = Xcp∑
p
′ X
cp
′
Np =
∑
c
McpScp
where Xcp is the total export of product p by country c.
Agricultural, textile and mining products, such as cocoa beans, cotton, tin, or petroleum gases, feature among the
products with the highest PGI products (see Table 1). Among the products with the lowest PGI values are manufactur-
ing and chemical products, such as analog instruments, miscellaneous pharmaceutical products, heating and cooling
equipment, or papermaking machine parts.
We use the PGI values to calculate the income inequality associated with the import and export portfolio of countries.
The Export Gini (XGini) is defined as the average PGI of the products present in a country’s export portfolio, the Import
Gini (ImpGini) as the average PGI of the country’s import portfolio. The XGini and ImpGini of country c are calculated
as:
XGinic = 1
Nc
∑
p
McpScpPGIp
Nc =
∑
p
McpScp
ImpGinic = 1∼Nc
∑
p
∼Mcp∼ScpPGIp
∼Nc =
∑
p
∼Ncp∼Scp
where Scp (∼Scp) is the share of product p in the country’s c export (imports) to a set of different countries, Mcp
(∼Mcp) is 1 if product p is produced (imported) by country c with revealed comparative advantage and 0 otherwise,
and Nc (∼Nc) is a normalizing factor to ensure that the XGini (ImpGini) is a weighted average of the PGI.
Moreover, we not only analyze the average PGI values of the export of a country to the world (such as e.g. in
Hartmann et al., 2016), but also the imports and relationships with single countries or different geographic regions of
the World, such as East Asia, Sub-Saharian Africa or Southern Europe. A list of countries belonging to each geographic
region can be found in Table A1 of the Appendix
Finally, we deliberately use methods from visual complexity research and data visualization in this article (Hidalgo
et al., 2007; Simoes and Hidalgo, 2011; Guevara et al. 2016). For instance, colored trade matrices, temporal ranking
graphs, and product space visualizations can help to reveal the complex association between trade and inequality.
4. ResultsPlease cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
4.1. The core-periphery structures of income inequality in the global trade network
We start our analysis by estimating the income inequality associated with the imports and exports between countries.
The Product Gini Index (PGI) trade matrix illustrates the average PGIs of the exports and imports of 116 countries in
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Table 1
Top and bottom 15 products in the PGI ranking between 2000 and 2008.
15 Products with highest PGIS
Rank SITC ID SITC product PGI
766 721 Cocoa Beans 0.525
765 2654 Agave Fibers 0.520
764 6545 Jute Woven Fabrics 0.515
763 2640 Jute 0.512
762 4245 Castor Oil 0.506
761 6871 Unwrought Tin and Alloys 0.506
760 4314 Waxes 0.505
759 5622 Phosphatic Fertilizers 0.505
758 6592 Knotted Carpets 0.503
757 1213 Tobacco Refuse 0.503
756 2876 Tin 0.502
755 3413 Liquified Petroleum Gases 0.502
754 6521 Unbleached Cotton Woven Fabrics 0.502
753 5222 Inorganic Acids and Oxygen Compounds 0.501
752 6513 Cotton Yarn 0.501
15 Proudcts with lowest PGIS
Rank SITC ID SITC product PGI
15 7373 Miscellaneous Metalworking Machinery 0.357
14 8744 Analog Instruments for Physical Analysis 0.357
13 8996 Orthopedic Devices 0.357
12 5419 Non-Medicinal Pharmaceutical Products 0.357
11 7416 Miscellaneous Heating and Cooling Equipment 0.356
10 7452 Miscellaneous Non-Electrical Machines 0.355
9 121 Miscellaneous Animal Entrails 0.353
8 5838 Polymerization Ion Exchangers 0.353
7 7449 Miscellaneous Parts of Lifting Machinery 0.352
6 8851 Watches 0.352
5 7233 Road Rollers 0.346
4 6412 Rolls of Paper 0.345
3 5415 Hormones 0.342
2 7251 Cellulose Pulp Making Machines 0.339
1
2
t
i
n
o
d
r
e
A
t
A
a
i
T
t7259 Paper Making Machine Parts 0.337
010 (see Fig. 1). High average PGI values are colored red, while low average PGI values are blue. It can be observed
hat the bilateral XGini and ImpGinis — i.e., the weighted average PGI associated with the exports to a country (or
mports from a country) — varies across countries, geographic regions, and trade partners. Moreover, they are not
ecessarily reciprocal between trade partners. For instance, highly developed economies, such as Germany, Sweden
r South Korea mainly exchange low PGI products with each other but import products with higher PGI values from
eveloping economies. The PGI trade matrix illustrates a clear core-periphery structure, between different geographic
egions, consisting in a periphery exporting products with high levels of inequality associated with them, and a core
xporting products with low average PGI values (see also Appendix A1 for an aggregation by geographic region).
dditionally, the total trade volume between the core countries of the world economy is significantly larger than the
rade among the countries from the periphery, and the trade between the core and the periphery (see Appendix Figure
2).
The PGI bilateral trade matrix helps in understanding which geographic regions of the world form part of the core
nd the periphery of the world economy and how this positioning in the global trade network is associated with incomePlease cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
nequality in the respective countries. (A full list of the countries belonging to each geographic region can be found in
able A1 of the Appendix). European, East Asian and North American economies mainly export low PGI products to
he rest of the world and import high PGI products from developing countries in Africa, Latin America, and Central,
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Fig. 1. The Product Gini Index (PGI) trade matrix in 2010. Each row depicts the exports of one country to the other 115 countries, each column the
imports of a country from the other 115 countries. The fields are colored according to their PGI values; high average PGI values are colored red,
low average PGI values blue, white fields indicate no significant exports/imports between these countries.
Western and Southern Asia. Interestingly, African, Latin American and Western Asian economies export relatively
lower PGI products to each other, in comparison to their trade flows with Europe. However, the amount of these trade
flows is significantly lower than the trade flows of these economies with European, East Asian or North American
economies. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the largest share of the trade of European economies is among each other
and consists of low PGI products (see also Fig. A2 in the Appendix).
Our results confirm the findings of previous studies on the core-periphery structure of the global trade system
(Prebisch, 1962; Wallerstein, 2004). Yet, the PGI values also allow us to reveal the types of products and the level ofPlease cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
inequality associated with these products. It becomes evident that the core of the world economy does not only produce
and export more sophisticated products and thus is richer than the periphery of the world economy (Gala et al., 2017),
but it also exports products associated with lower levels of income inequality. Thus, the core-periphery structure of
Please cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
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Fig. 2. Boxplots on the (a) XGinis and (b) ImpGinis of countries and regions in 2010.
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10 D. Hartmann et al. / EconomiA xxx (2019) xxx–xxxFig. 3. XGini and ImpGini clusters in the time period 1990–2010. Countries are colored according to 6 clusters identified by the K-means algorithm.
The XGini and ImpGini values of each country correspond to the average of their yearly values between 1990 and 2010.
global trade is arguably not only associated with income inequality between countries, but also with income inequality
within countries.
4.2. Differences in XGinis and ImpGinis across geographic regions and countries
In this section, we first analyze the boxplots of the XGini and ImpGini values of the different economic regions and
then cluster countries according to their XGini and ImpGini values.
Fig. 2(a) illustrates that Western and Northern European economies, followed by Southern European, North Amer-
ican and East Asian economies, have the lowest XGinis, and thus lowest levels of income inequality associated with
their export portfolios (see Fig. 2a). These (relatively) low levels of XGINI help to promote inclusive growth. In con-
trast, African economies, followed by Central, Western and Southern Asian economies have the highest XGini values,
and thus their productive structures and export portfolio imposes strong constraints on their ability to reduce income
inequality.
The differences in the ImpGinis between the geographic regions are significantly less pronounced (see Fig. 2b).
This is the case because the import portfolios of the most countries are much more similar than their export portfolios.
Still, there are noteworthy differences and outliers. For instance, Central Asian economies, such as Kazakhstan, Turk-
menistan, or Uzbekistan, have a significantly lower ImpGini than most other regions. The reason for this is that they
import a large amount of manufactured, intermediate to low PGI products, such as valves, iron pipes, or air pumps that
are necessary for the extraction and distribution of their main export products, such as crude petroleum, petroleum gas
or gold. Conversely, East Asian and some Southern Asian economies have a very high ImpGini, because they import
a large amount of primary goods with high PGI values, such as crude petroleum, iron, and food. Finally, Western
European economies also have lower ImgGini than most other regions (except Central Asia), due to a large share of
low PGI imports from other European economies.Please cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
Next, we analyze differences and similarities across countries from different regions. For this purpose, we analyze
the scatterplot of the 116 countries’ XGinis and ImpGini values between 1990 and 2010 (see Fig. 3). One important
observation is that there is no clear correlation between XGinis and ImpGinis. Thus, it cannot be generalized that
countries with lower XGini values tend to have higher ImpGini values, or vice versa. There is rather a trend that
ARTICLE IN PRESS+ModelECON-161; No. of Pages 24
D. Hartmann et al. / EconomiA xxx (2019) xxx–xxx 11
c
h
1Fig. 4. The evolution of (a) XGinis and (b) ImpGinis between 1970 and 2010.
ountries that have both low XGinis and low ImpGini tend to be highly developed, and that countries that have bothPlease cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
igh XGini and ImpGinis tend to be less developed. By applying a K-means algorithm (Jain, 2010) we can group the
16 countries into 6 clusters with low, medium or high XGini and ImpGini values. The K-means algorithm clusters
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Fig. 5. The Product Gini Space. In this visualization of the product space, nodes are colored according to a product’s PGI as measured between
2000 and 2008. The network is based on a proximity matrix representing 766 SITC-4 products classes exported between 1963 and 2008. The link
strength (proximity) is based on the conditional probability that the products are co-exported.elements in a n-dimensional space by finding the position of k centroids that minimize the distance to the data-points
(Jain, 2010).
On the left bottom of Fig. 3 can observe a green colored cluster of countries with both low XGini and ImpGini
values. This green cluster comprises mainly countries from Western and Northern Europe, such as France, Germany,
and Sweden, but also some other highly industrialized countries such as Canada or Mexico1 . On the right next to
the green cluster is an orange cluster with (relatively) low XGini and intermediate ImpGini values. This cluster is
comprised of countries, such as the US, Spain or Brazil. On the right side of Fig. 3 is a blue cluster of countries with
very high ImpGinis and low to intermediate XGinis, comprised by Eastern and Southern Asian economies, such as
Japan and South Korea, but also India and Bangladesh. These countries have a very high ImpGini, because they import
a large amount of primary high PGI products, such as crude petroleum and agricultural products. On the left top of
the ImpGini - XGini scatterplot are red and purple clusters with a high XGinis and low to low ImpGini values. These
two clusters are mainly comprised of countries that export crude petroleum, petroleum gas or minerals. The countries
of the red cluster, such as Russia, Norway, of Argentina, though are also able to export some products with lower
PGI products, whereas the countries of the purple group, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Yemen, or
Ecuador almost exclusively export crude petroleum or other primary products. Both in the case of the red and purple
groups, the income from crude petroleum and other minerals requires them to buy complex low PGI products for their
extractive activities, and also allows (at least) parts of its population to buy low inequality products, such as cars. In
consequence, they have (relatively) low ImpGini values. Finally, there is a gray cluster of mainly poor economies with
both relatively high XGini and ImpGini values, such as Namibia, Morocco, Peru or Nicaragua.Please cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
1 As a caveat, it must be noted that Mexico’s high export and import sophistication, and thus respective high XGini and low ImpGinis, is partially
distorted by its maquiladora production for its close neighbor USA. In consequence, its XGini and ImpGini values are likely to be undervalued.
Please cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
ARTICLE IN PRESS+ModelECON-161; No. of Pages 24
D. Hartmann et al. / EconomiA xxx (2019) xxx–xxx 13
Fig. 6. The XGini and ImpGini Product Spaces of (a) Sri Lanka, (b) Brazil, (c) South Korea, and (d) Germany in 2010. Each node represents a
SITC-4 product and is colored according to its PGI value.
ARTICLE IN PRESS+ModelECON-161; No. of Pages 24
14 D. Hartmann et al. / EconomiA xxx (2019) xxx–xxxFig. 7. The stage of economic development and closeness to low PGI products. Each node represents a country in the time periods 1970, 1980,
1990, 2000, and 2010, the position of the nodes depends on their Economic Complexity Index (ECI) and their closeness to low PGI products.
4.3. The evolution of XGinis and ImpGinis
In this section, we analyze the evolution of the 116 countries’ XGinis and the ImpGinis in the period between 1970
and 2010. We can observe that the XGini values slightly converged in this period in which several developed economies
outsourced parts of their production and several developing and emerging economies diversified into more advanced
products, such as textiles, metal products or manufactures. However, despite the slight convergence in absolute values,
the XGini ranking remained remarkably stable (see Fig. 4a). Only a few countries, such as Turkey, the Philippines,
and Tunisia, countries significantly moved up the XGini ranking due to significant industrialization and economic
catch-up processes, and only a few countries, such as Norway, Zimbabwe or Congo saw a significant deterioration of
their XGini ranking position due to a “resource curse” related to crude petroleum, gold fever, or war, respectively. Still
the top of the XGini ranking is dominant by Northern and Western European economies, such as Germany, France, the
UK, Denmark, or Sweden, while the bottom of the XGini ranking is dominated by African and Arab countries, such
as Nigeria, Ghana, Iran or Qatar that are strongly dependent on the export of crude petroleum or simple agricultural
products (See Fig. A3a in the Appendix).
The ImpGinis values and rankings were significantly less stable (Fig. 4b). Most economies saw a significant increase
of their ImpGini values in the time between 1970 and 2010. The main reason for this trend is the global export and
import of primary products associated with high PGIs, such as crude petroleum, minerals, or tropical fruits, significantly
increased in this period. However, some economies, like Japan, saw a significant decline in their previously extremely
high ImpGinis. Additionally, we can observe a large level of fluctuation in the ranking positions (see Fig. A3b in the
Appendix). There are several reasons for this. Most importantly, the differences in the import portfolios of the countries
around the world are significantly smaller than the differences in their export portfolios. While not all countries are
able to export manufactured goods, most countries import both manufactured and primary goods. In consequence,
small changes frequently led to significant changes in the ranking position. Yet there are also some clear, though
heterogeneous, trends across countries. For instance, the ImpGini ranking position of Germany significantly increasedPlease cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
between 1970 and 2010. This is arguably due to the establishment of more complex value chains across Europe and
thus a higher amount of low PGI products from other European economies. Indeed, several Western and Northern
European economies, such as Germany, France, and the UK, featured among the countries with the greatest upward
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ovement in the ImpGini ranking (toward lower ImpGinis). Conversely, the ImpGini ranking position of South Korea
ignificantly decreased between 1970 and 2010. This is arguably the case because South Korea outsourced many simple
nd high PGI products, such as textiles and agricultural products, and its economic growth model is dependent on the
mport of high PGI products, such as crude petroleum and other natural resources. Among the economies with the
argest downwards movements in the ImpGini ranking, feature also South Africa, Pakistan, and Greece, which also
aw a large increase in crude petroleum and other primary product imports.
It must be noted that the import portfolios, and thus the ImpGini values of countries, strongly depend on their natural
esource endowments, trade unions (such as in the case of Europe) as well as the embeddedness in global value chains.
mong the countries with the lowest ImpGinis ranking position in 2010 were both (1) several natural resource-rich
ountries, such as Argentina or Saudi Arabia, countries that need to import many low PGI products (such as machinery
r cars), as well as (2) several highly industrialized countries from Europe, which trade many low PGI products among
hemselves. At the bottom ImpGini ranking in 2010 featured both (1) industrialized Eastern Asian economies, such as
apan and South Korea – that outsourced low PGI products and depend on the importation of food, crude petroleum
nd natural resources – as well as (2) developing countries from Africa and Asia, such as Sri Lanka or Côte d’Ivoire,
hat needed to import basic products and have a lower demand and acquisitive power for manufactured goods (see
ig. A3 in the Appendix).
.4. The structural developmental trap of being close to high PGI products
Next, we use the PGI values in combination with the product space to reveal the structural constraints that developing
nd emerging economies face in moving into production and export of lower PGI products. The product space is a
etwork that estimates the shared productive capabilities, and thus also knowledge similarity, required to produce
wo different trade products. It accomplishes this by measuring the conditional probability of a country co-exporting
wo products (Hidalgo et al., 2007; Hausmann et al., 2014). For instance, countries that are able to export cars are
lso likely to have the capabilities to export trucks, while exporting cars do not necessarily provide countries with
he capabilities to export computer parts. Thus, similar products imply similar productive capabilities, and therefore
imilar types of human capital, technology, and institutions. Dissimilar products, on the contrary, have significantly
ifferent productive capabilities. Fig. 5 illustrates the Product Space with each node representing a SITC trade product
hat is colored according to its PGI value (Hartmann et al., 2017). We can observe that the products in the core center
nd left of the product space have significantly lower PGI values than products in the periphery and on the right side
f the product space.
Examining the XGini and ImpGini Product Space of very poor and unequal countries, such as Sri Lanka or Nicaragua,
eveals that they export products the periphery of the product space, with high PGIs, and import a wide variety of products
rom all across the product space, including basic products. For instance, Sri Lanka strongly focuses on the export of
extile products as well as some simple agricultural products, such as tea and spices (Fig. 6a). Its productive structure
s far away from low inequality products in the center of the product space. This puts severe structural constraints on
ri Lanka’s ability for inclusive growth because moving into distant parts of the product space is very difficult. As an
xample, moving competitively into the car industry would require Sri Lanka to build up capabilities in a varied set
f technological and economic activities associated with competitiveness in the car industry such as metal products,
ar components, glass, electronics and so forth. Moreover, a look at the ImpGini Product Space shows that Sri Lanka
mports a wide variety of products, including a relatively large share of basic products associated with high levels of
nequality. Sri Lanka is a case that shows how the lack of embeddedness into more complex global value chains leads
o a lack of (specialization in certain types of) manufactured imports. Moreover, as Sri Lanka does not produce more
omplex and low inequality products itself, it also has a very limited absorptive capacity to learn from these types of
roducts and what may be necessary to build them.
Next, we examine the XGini and ImpGini Space of countries that face the middle-income trap. The economies of
ountries, like Brazil or South Africa have been historically based on their resource richness and the exploitation of
heap labor. They have managed to diversify their economies to a certain extent into a varied set of primary products andPlease cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
ome manufacturing activities, yet face problems making the transition from an economic development model based
n cheap labor towards an economic development model based on knowledge, collective learning, and innovation.
Due to its (relatively) large internal market, Brazil has been partially successful with state-driven industrialization
rocesses and the attraction of some foreign direct investment. Some Brazilian companies have managed to produce
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complex products with lower PGIs, such as airplanes. Moreover, several foreign companies also produce industrial
goods in Brazil. Nonetheless, the largest share of its exports is still based on resource-based products that are associated
with high levels of inequality, such as iron ore or soybeans (see Fig. 6b). Due to its vast natural resource richness, its
XGini Product Space has a “gravitational force” towards specialization on high PGI products in agriculture and mining
in the periphery of the product space. This gravitational force is further aggravated in recent years by the rising demand
of China and other Asian economies for Brazil’s commodities and the competition the same countries impose for the
attraction of FDI in more advanced industries (Estevadeordal et al., 2016).
A look at the import portfolio shows how most of Brazil’s imports are low PGI chemical and manufacturing products.
Brazil produces many intermediate to high PGI products, such as agricultural products, textile or simple metal products
internally and thus does not need to import them. In sum, Brazil focuses on the production and export of high PGI
products and imports low PGI products.
The XGini and ImpGini Spaces of several East Asian economies, such as Japan and South Korea, reveal a sub-
stantially different picture as they have successfully managed to catch-up and leapfrog ahead in advanced economic
activities. For instance, South Korea’s exports in 2010 are mainly comprised of electronics and manufacturing products
with low to intermediate PGI values (Fig. 6c). Among its import portfolio are low PGI imports in chemical, electronics
and some manufacturing industries, as well as high PGI imports in the form of several types of commodities. It must
be noted that South Korea and several other East Asian, and now increasingly South Eastern Asian economies, experi-
enced a profound transformation of their productive structure. For instance, in 1970 a large percentage of South Korea’s
export consisted of high PGI textile products, today they outsourced many high PGI products and focus instead almost
exclusively on high PGI products. To achieve this, they smartly combined industrial and social policies (Wade, 1990;
Stiglitz, 1996; Amsden, 1992; Hartmann et al., 2016). For instance, they deliberately invested in education and skills
that are required in the new industries, such as engineering. It is noteworthy that countries learn from their neighbors
(Bahar et al., 2014); especially several (East) Asian economies seem to learn from their neighbors how to transform
their economies into more complex products. First Japan, then the Tiger States, then China and now several others
have moved or are in the process of moving into more advanced industries.
Finally, highly developed economies in Europe, such as Germany, Sweden or Switzerland, almost exclusively focus
on the export of low PGI products in manufacturing and chemical products. For instance, Germany has revealed
comparative advantages (RCA) in virtually all chemical and manufacturing products, and virtually no RCA in high
PGI products (see Fig. 6d). Moreover, it also imports a large number of low PGI products, especially from other
European economies, both in terms of inputs in complex value chains as well as end consumer. Most of its textile
and commodities imports come from developing or middle-income countries. Having said this, it must be noted that
once Germany was also a catch-up economy in the industrialization led by the UK; it focused at some point on textile
industries, before becoming one of the leading economies in terms of chemical and manufacturing products.
4.5. Stage of economic development and the closeness to low PGI products
Next, we analyze the distance of the 116 countries’ export portfolio to low PGI products, and how this distance
changed during their process of economic development in the period between 1970 and 2010. To capture the distance
to low PGI products, we measure the Pearson correlation between the measured density (ωcp) of products without
revealed comparative advantage in country c and the PGI values of these products. A positive correlation implies that
countries are close to low PGI products, a negative correlation indicates that a country is close to high PGI products.
Fig. 7 shows that until reaching an intermediate to high level of economic development—as measured by economic
complexity—countries are relatively close to products that are associated with high levels of inequality. Only a few
countries, such as South Korea, were able to move up the ladder towards low PGI products, as produced by highly
developed economies like Germany. Instead, most middle-income countries such as South Africa and Brazil made
some progress in terms of economic diversification, yet they are barely closer to being specialized in low PGI products
than poor economies, such as Sri Lanka or Nicaragua. They face great obstacles in moving towards more inclusive
and complex parts of the products space. Most “low hanging fruits” were exploited and substantial changes of thePlease cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
productive capabilities would be necessary to climb into more complex and inclusive parts of the product space. At this
intermediate stage, there is both a certain gravitational force towards high PGI products, which are close, and major
structural obstacles to transform the economy. Profound changes in skills, institutions, infrastructure and productive
organization would be necessary to move from the exploitation of natural resources and cheap labor towards a more
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nowledge-based economy based on productivity and innovation (Rhee, 2012; Felipe et al., 2012a,b; Jankowska
t al., 2012; Lee, 2013). Most likely this change would also imply creative destruction processes that can change the
reexisting power structures and requires workers, employees, and managers to change their skills and competences
ubstantially. This change would also require profound changes in the education system and human capital. Only a
ew countries, mostly from East Asia, have managed recently to make this profound change based on a combination
f industrial, educational, and social policies (Wade, 1990; Stiglitz, 1996; Jankowska et al., 2012). A set of other
iddle-income countries, such as Brazil and South Africa have strong structural constraints to make this transition
owards more inclusive growth into more complex and lower PGI parts of the product space.
. Conclusions
This article illustrated how methods from economic complexity research can be used to explore the complex
ssociation between trade and inequality. Analyzing the inequality associated with the trade specializations and flows
etween 116 countries, allowed us to illustrate that the core-periphery structure of trade is not only be associated with
he income inequality between countries, but also within countries. While highly developed countries mainly export
roducts with a low Product Gini Index (PGI) to both developing and developed economies, developing economies
ainly export high inequality products to the world.
We also show that the evolution of XGini values of 116 countries was much more stable in the period between
970 and 2010 than the evolution of the ImpGini values. This is due to the fact that despite some catch-up processes
f developing countries in terms of the production of manufactured goods, the total distance in productive capabilities
nd emphasis on either more or less exploitative parts of the global values is still very large. Yet, the import portfolios
f countries depend on a variety of factors, such as trade unions and resource richness, and thus the need for primary
roducts such as food, minerals or crude petroleum. Despite the fluctuations and heterogeneous trends of countries’
egarding their ImpGinis, we can identify clusters of similar countries. For instance, there are several oil and other
atural resource dependent countries that have a high XGini and a low ImpGini due to their need of importing low PGI
nputs, such as valves and pumps, for the extraction and distribution of their natural resources, as well as their demand
or consumer goods, such as cars. Moreover, there is a group of East Asian economies, like South Korea or Japan, that
xport low PGI products, yet also need to import a large amount of high PGI products, such as crude petroleum or
inerals to fuel their economic growth model. Moreover, highly developed economies from Europe mainly exchange
ow PGI product among themselves. Finally, there is a group of developing economies that both mainly export and
mport intermediate to high PGI products.
Moreover, only a few countries, such as South Korea, have managed to move up the ladder towards high levels
f economic complexity and low XGini values. Our analysis of product space dynamics reveals that the transition
rom an emerging to a developed economy is complicated because after an initial process of diversification middle
ncome and high inequality countries, such as Brazil or South Africa, may find themselves in a development trap
onsisting in a productive structure that is close high PGI products and distant to low PGI products of the product
pace. In consequence, these countries face a gravitational force towards high inequality products in the periphery of
he product space. Yet, the experience of successful East Asian economies shows that neither closing the markets nor
ere state-driven industrialization alone may be the solution to overcome development traps. Instead, concerted action
nd collective learning between companies, government, and the civil society is necessary to establish prolific systems
f innovation and competence building (Lundvall et al., 2011; Lee, 2013; Hartmann, 2014). This includes a deliberate
mphasis on both internal capability upgrading as well as external learning through trade and international innovation
etworks (Pyka et al., 2016). Closing the market alone will not be the solution, because it also means cutting off the
ipeline to necessary inputs and a large amount of knowledge. The cases of successful Asian economies have shown
hat a simultaneous emphasis on state and market forces, industrial and social policies, internal and external learning
re necessary to climb up the steep ladder of development (Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1992; Stiglitz, 1996; Lee, 2013).
As a caveat of our analysis, it must be noted that we only analyze the international trade of goods, and not of
ervices. Moreover, we do not know yet how digital technologies may change the structure of the product space and thePlease cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
nequality associated with different types of manufactures. Finally, we do not analyze in this article the impacts of firm
ize distributions and different institutional and growth regimes on structural transformations and the distribution of
ncome (Boschma and Capone, 2015; Ciarli et al., 2017). Certainly, these will be important lines of inquiry for future
esearch.
Please cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
of income inequality. EconomiA (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.09.001
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Nonetheless, we showed how new methods from economic complexity help to provide new empirical insights into
the complex association between trade and inequality. We were able to illustrate the core-periphery structure of income
inequality associated to the international trade specializations in the time period between 1970 and 2010. Moreover,
we were able to reveal the structural constraints of middle- income high-inequality countries, such as Brazil or South
Africa, to climb up the development ladder towards a more inclusive productive structure.
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Appendix
Table A1
List of countries belonging to each geographic region.
Region Country ISO Region Country ISO
Central Asia Kazakhstan kaz South-eastern Asia Cambodia khm
Central Asia Turkmenistan tkm South-eastern Asia Indonesia idn
Central Asia Uzbekistan uzb South-eastern Asia Malaysia mys
Eastern Asia China chn South-eastern Asia Burma mmr
Eastern Asia Hong Kong hkg South-eastern Asia Philippines phl
Eastern Asia Japan jpn South-eastern Asia Singapore sgp
Eastern Asia North Korea prk South-eastern Asia Thailand tha
Eastern Asia South Korea kor South-eastern Asia Vietnam vnm
Eastern Europe Belarus blr Southern Asia Bangladesh bgd
Eastern Europe Bulgaria bgr Southern Asia India ind
Eastern Europe Czech Republic cze Southern Asia Iran irn
Eastern Europe Hungary hun Southern Asia Pakistan pak
Eastern Europe Moldova mda Southern Asia Sri Lanka lka
Eastern Europe Poland pol Southern Europe Bosnia and Herzegovina bih
Eastern Europe Russia rus Southern Europe Croatia hrv
Eastern Europe Slovakia svk Southern Europe Greece grc
Eastern Europe Ukraine ukr Southern Europe Italy ita
Latin America and the Caribbean Argentina arg Southern Europe Macedonia mkd
Latin America and the Caribbean Bolivia bol Southern Europe Portugal prt
Latin America and the Caribbean Brazil bra Southern Europe Slovenia svn
Latin America and the Caribbean Chile chl Southern Europe Spain esp
Latin America and the Caribbean Colombia col Sub-Saharan Africa Angola ago
Latin America and the Caribbean Costa Rica cri Sub-Saharan Africa Botswana bwa
Latin America and the Caribbean Cuba cub Sub-Saharan Africa Cameroon cmr
Latin America and the Caribbean Dominican Republic dom Sub-Saharan Africa Republic of the Congo cog
Latin America and the Caribbean Ecuador ecu Sub-Saharan Africa IvoryCoast civ
Latin America and the Caribbean El Salvador slv Sub-Saharan Africa Gabon gab
Latin America and the Caribbean Guatemala gtm Sub-Saharan Africa Ghana gha
Latin America and the Caribbean Honduras hnd Sub-Saharan Africa Guinea gin
Latin America and the Caribbean Jamaica jam Sub-Saharan Africa Kenya ken
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Table A1 (Continued)
Region Country ISO Region Country ISO
Latin America and the Caribbean Mexico mex Sub-Saharan Africa Liberia lbr
Latin America and the Caribbean Nicaragua nic Sub-Saharan Africa Mauritius mus
Latin America and the Caribbean Panama pan Sub-Saharan Africa Mozambique moz
Latin America and the Caribbean Paraguay pry Sub-Saharan Africa Namibia nam
Latin America and the Caribbean Peru per Sub-Saharan Africa Nigeria nga
Latin America and the Caribbean Trinidad and Tobago tto Sub-Saharan Africa South Africa zaf
Latin America and the Caribbean Uruguay ury Sub-Saharan Africa Tanzania tza
Latin America and the Caribbean Venezuela ven Sub-Saharan Africa Zambia zmb
Northern Africa Algeria dza Sub-Saharan Africa Zimbabwe zwe
Northern Africa Egypt egy Western Asia Azerbaijan aze
Northern Africa Libya lby Western Asia Georgia geo
Northern Africa Morocco mar Western Asia Israel isr
Northern Africa Sudan sdn Western Asia Jordan jor
Northern Africa Tunisia tun Western Asia Kuwait kwt
Northern America Canada can Western Asia Lebanon lbn
Northern America United States usa Western Asia Oman omn
Northern Europe Denmark dnk Western Asia Qatar qat
Northern Europe Estonia est Western Asia Saudi Arabia sau
Northern Europe Finland fin Western Asia Syria syr
Northern Europe Ireland irl Western Asia Turkey tur
Northern Europe Latvia lva Western Asia United Arab Emirates are
Northern Europe Lithuania ltu Western Asia Yemen yem
Northern Europe Norway nor Western Europe Austria aut
Northern Europe Sweden swe Western Europe Belgium bel
Northern Europe United Kingdom gbr Western Europe France fra
Oceania Australia aus Western Europe Germany deu
Oceania New Zealand nzl Western Europe Netherlands nld
Oceania Papua New Guinea png Western Europe Switzerland chePlease cite this article in press as: Hartmann, D., et al., International trade, development traps, and the core-periphery structure
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